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SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 - INSIDER TRADING
- CONVERSION OF PREFERRED INTO COMMON STOCK
HELD NOT A SALE OF THE STOCK UNDER SECTION 16(b)
Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966).
Prior to the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act),' it was not unusual for officers, directors, and influ-
ential stockholders to abuse their positions of trust by utilizing confi-
dential information to obtain large profits on stocks of their corpo-
rations traded on the national security exchanges.2 Speculative
profits by insiders were accepted by the financial community as part
of the emolument for serving as a corporate officer or director.3
In order to protect the investing public from these practices and
to establish a fair and honest market in security transactions, the
Exchange Act was enacted.4 Section 16(b)5 was incorporated into
the act to implement its prevailing purpose by making it unprof-
itable for any insider to engage in short-swing speculation.6 Section
16(b) provides that the corporation or an individual stockholder
acting in its behalf may bring a suit to recover any short-swing
profit realized through a purchase and sale or sale and purchase
of any equity security7 of the issuer within a period of less than six
'148 Star. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1964) [hereinafter cited as Ex-
change Act].
2 Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the sub-
committee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and
officers of corporations by using their positions of trust and the confidential
information which came to them to aid them in their market activities.
Closely allied to this type of abuse was the unscrupulous employment of
inside information by large stockholders who, while not directors and officers,
exercised sufficient control over the destinies of their companies to enable
them to acquire and profit by information not available to others. S. REP.
No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
a For a comprehensive study of the practices leading up to the enactment of §
16(b), see Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act (pt.
1), 66 HARv. L. REV. 385 (1953); Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers
and Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MIcH. L. REV. 133(1939). See generally S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 29-68 (1934); S. REP.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
13-14 (1934).
4 See H.R. Rm. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
5 Exchange Act § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1964).
6 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943).
7 "Equity security" is defined as "any stock or similar security; or any security con-
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months by an officer,8 director,' or beneficial owner1" of more than
ten percent of any class of equity security.
Because of the difficulty in establishing a conscious misuse by
an insider of confidential information to make a profit, section
16(b) imposes on these individuals a "prophylactic" measure of
absolute liability for a purchase followed by a sale within six
months." Thus, a showing of actual possession or use of inside
information is not required, and the fact that the insider did not
make use of confidential information or acted in good faith is
irrelevant." In Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,8 the court recognized
the need for having an objective criterion, stating that "it is appar-
ent.., from the language of section 16(b) itself, as well as from
the Congressional hearings, that the only remedy which the framers-
deemed effective for this reform was the imposition of a liability
based upon an objective measure of proof."' 4  The court also stated
that in order to effectuate the broadly remedial purposes of the
vertible, with or without consideration, into such a security, or carrying any warrant
or right to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any such warrant or right... :'
Exchange Act § 3(a)(11), 48 Stat. 884 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11)
(1964).
8
"Officers" is defined to mean "a president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary,
comptroller, and any other person who performs for an issuer, whether incorporated
or unincorporated, functions corresponding to those performed by the foregoing offi-
cers." SEC Exchange Act Rule 3b-2, 17 CF.R. § 240.3b-2 (rev. ed. 1964).
9 "Director" is defined in Exchange Act § 3(a)(7), 48 Stat. 883 (1934), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(7) (1964) to mean "any director of a corporation or any person
performing similar functions with respect to any organization, whether incorporated or
unincorporated."
10 See generally Feldman & Teberg, Beneficial Ownership Under Section 16 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 W. RES. L. REv. 1054 (1966).
1" See 59 HARv. L. REv. 998, 999 (1946).
12 See B. T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1964); Blau v.
Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 791 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
The need for having an objective measure of proof was explained by Thomas Cor-
coran, chief spokesman for the proponents of the act, when he testified before a con-
gressional committee:
That is to prevent directors receiving the benefits of short-term speculative
swings on the securities of their own companies, because of inside informa-
tion. The profit on such transaction under the bill would go to the corpora-
tion. You hold the director, irrespective of an intention or expectation to
sell the security within six months after, because it will be absolutely impos-
sible to prove the existence of such intention or expectation, and you have
to have this crude rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden
of having to prove that the director intended, at the time he bought to get
out on a short swing. Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56
& 97 (73d Cong.) Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,
73d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934).
'S 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
14 Id. at 235.
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
statute it would be necessary to "squeeze" all possible profits which
were reaped because of insider information. 5
Section 16(b)'s "crude rule of thumb"1 regulatory mechanism
has been called arbitrary,17 for although information has been un-
fairly used the section has no impact on a mere purchase or a sale
based on such information. Moreover, the section does not protect
the people who bought from or sold to the insider but instead aids
the corporation which suffered no injury."8
The operative words of section 16 (b) are "purchase" and "sale."
These terms are defined broadly by the statute, for section 3 (a) (13)
defines "purchase" to include "any contract to buy, purchase, or
otherwise acquire"'" and section 3(a) (14) defines "sale" to include
"any contract to sell or otherwise dispose"'0 of a security. One
writer has stated that section 16(b) is one of the most ambiguous
of all the "New Deal" legislation since there are many types of
transactions which do not fit within or without the contemplation
of the vague statutory language."1
Two approaches have been developed by the courts to determine
whether a given transaction is a purchase or sale within the prohi-
bition of the statute. The first is the strict or all-inclusive ap-
proach.22 This view states that in order to achieve the underlying
purpose of the statute, the broadest possible construction must be
given to the terms so as to eliminate the possibility of error inherent
in discretionary administration." The second view is the liberal or
rule of reason approach which urges that the section's purpose can
be accomplished without subjecting every transaction that might be
15 Id. at 239.
16 Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56 & 97 (73d Cong.), supra note
12, at 6557.
172 Loss, SEcuRMEs REGULATION 1088 (2d ed. 1961).
18 Ibid.
19 Exchange Act § 3(a) (13), 48 Stat. 884 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78c-
(a)(13) (1964).
2 0 Exchange Act § 3(a) (14), 48 Stat. 884 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78c-
(a)(14) (1964).
21 See Comment, 64 MIc L Rnv. 474, 476 (1966).
22 Comment, 11 STAN. L. REV. 358, 359 (1959).
23 Ibid. See, e.g., Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965) (con-
version of bond for common stock held a sale); Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954) (exchange by an insider corporation of
stock held by it for stock of its less than wholly owned subsidiary held a sale); Walet
v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820
(1953) (exercise of stock option of treasury stock held a purchase); Blau v. Hodgkin-
son, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (exchange of stock of subsidiary for stock of
parent pursuant to a plan of corporate simplification held a purchase).
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a purchase and sale within the definition section of the act to its
sanctions, the controlling factor being the intent of Congress and
not the semantic problem of defining terms.25 Under this view,
section 16(b) is not applied if a given transaction poses no possi-
bility of insider abuse. 6 However, if a given transaction could
produce the result 16(b) was designed to prevent, its sanctions are
applied automatically without examining the details of the transac-
tion.
Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 8 was the first significant case
to consider whether a conversion of preferred into common stock
was a purchase. The court held that such a conversion followed
by a sale within six months constituted a purchase and sale within
the statutory language of 16(b):
Whatever doubt might otherwise exist as to whether a conver-
sion is a -purchase" is dispelled by definition of "purchase" to
include "any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." ...
Defendants did not own the common stock in question before they
exercised their option to convert; they did afterward. Therefore
they acquired the stock, within the meaning of the Act.2 9
This very broad language might suggest that every conversion is a
purchase within the meaning of the act, and several courts and
writers have so interpreted itYs However, whether or not the Park
& Tilford case embraced the strict or all-inclusive views' is unclear
because in arriving at its decision, the court considered such factors
as the defendant's ownership of a controlling interest in the plaintiff
corporation, the convertible preferred not being traded on an ex-
change, and the preferred not being protected by an anti-dilution
provision and thus not the economic equivalent of the common.
8! 2
24 See Comment, supra note 22, at 359-61.
25 Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
927 (1959).
26 See, e.g., Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82, 85-86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
827 (1954); Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016
(1954); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907
(1949).
7BIatt v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 519 (2d Cir. 1966).
28160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
291d. at 987.
30See Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 792 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd, 368 U.S. 403
(1962); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 761 (1947); Comment supra note 22, at 359; Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 719, 721
(1959); 49 IOWA-L REV. 1346, 1351 (1964).
31 See Painter, The Evolving Role of Section 16(b), 62 McH. L. REV. 649, 660
(1964); 36 U. DET. L. J. 343, 347 (1959).
822 Loss, op. cit. supra note 17, at 1067; Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 346
(6th Cir. 1958) (Stewart, J., explaining the Park & Tilford case).
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One of the more recent decisions adopting the strict view is
He/i-Coil Corp. v. Webster,8 which was the first case to consider
whether a conversion of a bond into common stock constituted a
sale of the bond and purchase of the common within the prohibi-
tion of the statute. The defendant in Held-Coil obtained bonds
which were convertible into common stock, converted them, and
sold the common within six months of the conversion date but
more than eight months after purchasing the bonds. The court
held that the conversion was a sale of the convertible security and
a purchase of the conversion security. However, the court held
that the defendant should be held liable only for the purchase
aspect of the conversion for no profits were realized on the sale. 4
The court reached this result by concluding that these transactions
were a purchase and sale within the definition section of the statute
and thus 16(b) should apply without further inquiry. 5 The court
felt that it did not have to consider whether a conversion in any
way lent itself to .the accomplishment of what the statute was de-
signed to prevent, for if the transaction was a purchase and sale
within the definition section of the act 16(b) would apply."6 Al-
though the court conceded that the common stock was the economic
equivalent of the debentures and the conversion presented little
opportunity for speculation, the court employed a mechanical or
automatic rule.3
Other courts have adopted a liberal view and have declined to
extend the application of 16(b) to every transaction which con-
ceivably would be a purchase and sale within the definition section
of the statute.3  In Ferraiolo v. NewmanW9 it was held that the
conversion of preferred into common was not a 16(b) purchase be-




37 Id. at 164-65.
38 See, e.g., Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966) (conversion of pre-
ferred into common not a purchase); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965) (exchange of common for Class A stock not a
purchase); Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016
(1954) (sale of stock to wholly owned subsidiary of a corporate insider not a sale);
Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954) (receipt of
stock in reclassification not a purchase); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949) (receipt of stock warrants distributed equally to all
stockholders not a purchase); Hennesey v. Fein, 184 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)
(stock transaction rescinded with judicial approval not a purchase).
39 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
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cause the receipt of preferred for common stock placed the insider
in no better position to protect the post-conversion profit which he
legally could have obtained had he sold the convertible security six
months after the date of its original purchase.40 The court also
based its decision on the fact that the conversion was involuntary,
the insiders not being in control of the corporation, that both stocks
were listed and actively traded, and that the conversion privilege
had an anti-dilution provision.41 The court's rule of reason ap-
proach to the problem was summarized by Judge Stewart (now Mr.
Justice Stewart) when he said that "every transaction which can
reasonably be defined as a purchase will be so defined, if the trans-
action is of a kind which can possibily lend itself to the speculation
encompassed by Section 16(b)."42
In Blau v. Lamb,43 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
the restrictive view and adopted the liberal approach. The plaintiff,
a stockholder of Air-Way Industries, Inc., brought suit in the district
court pursuant to section 16(b) of the Exchange Act to recover
short-swing profits allegedly realized by Edward Lamb and Edward
Lamb Enterprises, Inc. as a result of their dealings in the convertible
preferred stock of Air-Way. The district court held Lamb and
Enterprises liable for short-swing profits of over one million dollars
on the ground that the conversion of preferred into common stock
was a sale of the preferred because it lent itself to the accomplish-
ment of what section 16(b) was designed to prevent and, when
matched with the earlier purchase of preferred by Lamb and Enter-
prises, rendered them liable for insider profits.44 The court of
appeals reversed, however, holding that the conversion afforded the
insiders no opportunity to realize a gain by speculative trading in
the preferred and thus the conversion was not a sale under section
16(b).45
The court refused to accept the district court's opinion that the
existence of an opportunity for speculative profits could be inferred
from the fact of control alone, for the court believed that such a
conclusion would be inconsistent with its responsibility to analyze
the conversion in order to establish whether the possibility of unfair
40 Id. at 346.
41 Id. at 345.
42 bid.
43 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966).
44 Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), rev'd, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir.
1966).
45 363 F.2d at 522.
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speculative profits could exist even with full corporate control.46
The court was unwilling to adopt the mechanical or automatic ap-
proach as had the Third Circuit in Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster.47
Instead, the court in Lamb considered whether the conversion of
Air-Way preferred into Air-Way common "in any way lent itself
to the accomplishments of what Section 16(b) was designed to pre-
vent.) 48  The court held that since the preferred and common stock
were economic equivalents, and since Lamb and Enterprises had not
changed their investment positions, the conversion gave the insiders
no opportunity to realize a gain by speculative trading in Air-Way
preferred. 9 Thus, the court held the conversion was not a section
16(b) sale of the preferred. In essence the court was ascertaining
whether the pre-conversion profit was better protected by con-
version instead of holding the preferred for sale at a later date.
Since the conversion presented the insiders no possibility of making
their pre-conversion profit more certain, the court reasoned that the
insiders should not be penalized for doing indirectly what they could
have done directly."
Although the issue involved in Lamb had not been previously
considered by .the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit in Heli-Coil had
held that a conversion of a bond into common stock was a sale of
the bond and a purchase of the common." Thus, the two circuits
reached opposite results on similar facts due to their different inter-
pretations. The Securities and Exchange Commission has resolved
the conflict between the two circuits by enacting Amended Rule
16b-9,5" which provides for a "blanket" exemption for the conver-
461d. at 521.
47 See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
48 363 F.2d at 520.
49 Id. at 522.
50Id. at 519. The "rule of thumb" aspect of § 16(b) was not subverted, for the
Second Circuit did not examine whether the insiders acted in good faith or used confi-
dential information. The court was simply stating that the insiders had not placed
themselves in a position to make unfair use of insider information, since their tech-
nical conversion sale gave them no better opportunity to protect and reap their pre-
conversion profits than if they had held the convertible security and sold it after six
months. The court stated that § 16(b) would be applied automatically once it was
determined that an insider had placed himself in a better position to protect and reap
his pre-conversion profit.
51 See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
592 (a) Any acquisition or disposition of an equity security involved in the
conversion of an equity security which, by its terms or pursuant to the terms
of the corporate charter or other governing instruments, is convertible im-
mediately or after a stated period of time into another equity security of the
same issuer; shall be exempt from the operation of section 16(b) of the Act:
[Vol. 18: 986
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sion of any equity security convertible into any equity security of
the same issuer.
Under section 16(b) the Commission has the power to exempt
any transaction which falls within the letter of the statute but not
its spirit." By issuing Amended Rule 16b-9, the Commission has
adopted the liberal view of the Second Circuit in Blau v. Lamb54
and thus has agreed that a conversion does not make possible the
unfair insider trading that section 16(b) was designed to prevent.
The impact of the new rule will be that a conversion by an insider
will not be considered a purchase or a sale within the prohibition
of 16(b).t 5
The Lamb case was correctly decided, because the conversion of
preferred into common stock presented no possibility of unfair use
of information by insiders." The exchange of securities was within
the definition section of the statute; however, the privilege of con-
verting normally gives the owner of a preferred security a "continu-
ing inchoate interest in the equity of the common shareholders
which causes the value of the preferred to fluctuate with changes in
the market price of the common."57 This means that the apprecia-
Provided, however, That this section shall not apply to the extent that there
shall have been either (1) a purchase of any equity security of the class con-
vertible (including any acquisition of or change in a conversion privilege)
and a sale of any equity security of the class issuable upon conversion, or
(2) a sale of any equity security of the class convertible and any purchase of
any equity security issuable upon conversion (otherwise than in a transaction
involved in such conversion or in a transaction exempted by any other rule
under section 16(b) ), within a period of less than 6 months which includes
the date of conversion. 31 Fed. Reg. 3391 (1966), amending 17 C.F.R. §
240.16b-9 (1964). The amendment became effective February 17, 1966.
53 -1is subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction... or transac-
tions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not compre-
hended within the purpose of this section." Exchange Act § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896
(1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
54 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966). See Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, pp.
17-19, Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966).
55 Professor Robert Hamilton has concluded that the SEC's decision to exempt sub-
stantially all conversions from § 16(b) is sound because Rule 10b-5 can be employed
to plug any loopholes. However, he admits that the major difficulty with his approach
is the requirement that the material failure to disclose must have been "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security." Hamilton, Convertible Securities and Section
16(b): The End of an Era, 44 TmBAs L Rxv. 1447, 1494 n.150 (1966). It seems
inappropriate to support Amended Rule 16b-9 on the basis that Rule 10b-5 will fill in
the gaps when admitedly the 10b-5 alternative may encounter serious difficulties. See
text accompanying notes 61-63 infra.
56 The convertible preferred and common were economic equivalents, and the con-
vertible security contained an anti-dilution provision.
57 59 HARV. L. REV. 998, 999 (1946). See GRAHAm, DODD & ComTE, ScuRny
ANALJ.YSiS 603 (4th ed. 1962).
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tion or depreciation in value of the conversion security will be at
least equal to that of the convertible security."6 Thus, the same pre-
conversion profits can be made by converting and selling the con-
version security as by selling the convertible security, because con-
version simply results in postponing the date when a profit can be
made.
5 9
The conversion offers an insider no greater opportunity to reap
pre-conversion profits than if he held the convertible security, and
the risks of holding either are the same, since the prices of the two
move together."0
In considering the sale and purchase aspects of conversion, it
must be recognized that several transactions are factually distin-
guishable from Lamb because conversion in those cases affords the
insider greater protection for pre-conversion or post-conversion
profit. On the sale side of conversion, if a convertible security does
not contain an anti-dilution provision, the price of the convertible
security may be less than the conversion security because the market
fears a stock split or stock dividend.6' Although arbitrage will pre-
vent wide fluctuations in price which are unfavorable to a dilutable
issue, temporary differentials between the market prices of the se-
curities may still result. Thus, a person who owned the convertible
security could obtain a small profit by quickly converting and selling
the common stock.6" This situation would place an insider who
converted in a better position to reap the pre-conversion profit than
he would be if he had held the convertible security beyond the
six months period. A better rule than the "blanket" exemption
given to all equity conversions by Amended Rule 16b-9 would be
for the conversion to be called a sale if subsequent events showed
that a greater amount of the pre-conversion profit could be realized
by holding the conversion security than by holding the convertible
security for more than six months from the time of purchase.
There are two situations concerning the purchase aspect where
conversion affords the insider additional protection for his post-
conversion profit. First, in the absence of an anti-dilution provision,
an insider who converted could be placed in a better position to
obtain the post-conversion profit than if he had held the convertible
58 Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 510, 524 (1950); 72 HARV. L. REV. 1392, 1394 (1959).
59 See Comment, supra note 58, at 524.
60 See Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 522 (2d Cir. 1966); Brief for the SEC as
Amicus Curiae, p. 18, Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966).




security." Thus, a better rule would be that if subsequent events
showed that an insider realized a greater amount of post-conversion
profit by holding the conversion security during the six months
from the time of conversion than by holding the convertible security,
the conversion should be called a purchase.
Second, if the corporation redeemed its convertible preferred
stock and favorable news followed the redemption, the insider who
converted would be able to obtain a profit he could not have ob-
tained had he held the convertible security. Under Amended Rule
16b-9 this transaction would be exempt. However, a better rule
would be to consider the transaction a purchase if an insider con-
verted within a six-month period preceding the favorable news. In
this situation the insider has dearly improved his position to acquire
profits which he would not have been able to realize had he failed
to convert.
In conversion cases a particular transaction should be called a
sale or purchase only if the defendant's conversion placed him in a
position where his opportunity to protect and reap pre-conversion
or post-conversion profit is greater than it would have been had he
held the convertible security for more than six months. Once it is
determined that an insider has placed himself in a preferred posi-
tion, section 16(b) should be applied automatically. By using a rule
of reason to analyze conversion transactions, the purpose of section
16(b) will be fulfilled and transactions will not be penalized which
in no way enable an insider to enhance his position to acquire
profits to which he would be legally entitled had he not converted.
FRED A. WATKINS
63 Ibid.
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